D
o government distributive benefits increase voter turnout? Scholars have long argued that non-means-tested entitlement programs cause increased turnout among their beneficiaries. For example, the recipients of agricultural subsidies (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) , Social Security (Campbell 2002) , and Medicare and veterans' benefits (Mettler and Stonecash 2008; Verba et al. 1993 ) exhibit higher turnout rates than nonrecipients. At the aggregate level, counties and congressional districts respond to increased distributive spending with higher turnout (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006; Matsubayashi and Wu 2009) . A commonly hypothesized explanation for this positive turnout effect is Lipset's classic argument that one's decision to turn out depends upon the perceived "relevance of government policies to the individual" (1960, 190) . Under this theory, as articulated by subsequent scholars (e.g. , Campbell 2002; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) , the delivery of distributive benefits motivates recipients to protect their stake in these spending programs by participating in politics through voting.
However, there is reason to question whether this positive relationship between distributive benefits and turnout should hold for all voters, regardless of their partisanship. A voluminous literature on political behavior, beginning with The American Voter, argues that voters' responses to political events are conditioned by their partisanship. Voters' partisan identification serves as a "perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation" (Campbell et al. 1960, 133) . Partisanship affects voters' subjective judgments, such as their approval of presidential performance (Bartels 2002) , as well as objective evaluations, such as assessments of the economy Huber 2009, 2010) .
This article draws upon the political participation theory described by Lipset (1960) , Wolfinger and extending this classic theory to account for voters' partisan biases in their retrospective evaluations. This article's theory preserves these authors' original intuition that the recipients of distributive benefits are motivated to vote in order to protect their future benefits. But the theory also revises this argument by accounting for voters' partisan biases in deciding whether to turn out. The theory predicts that distributive spending can affect voter turnout in opposite directions, depending on the voter's partisanship: voters who share the incumbent's partisanship respond to benefits with increased turnout. But voters who align with the challenger's party respond to benefits with decreased turnout.
The intuition behind this asymmetric result is as follows. Each voter has an ideological preference for either the left-or right-wing party, but voters also generally prefer politicians who prioritize the delivery of distributive benefits. Hence, a voter who receives benefits from a same-party incumbent will respond with increased turnout in order to enhance the probability of reelecting the incumbent. By contrast, a voter who identifies with the challenger's party prefers to expel the incumbent for ideological reasons. But if the incumbent delivers benefits to this opposite-party voter, the voter may respond by not turning out to vote, as the incumbent's distributive generosity has mitigated the voter's motivation to oust the incumbent.
Borrowing from the retrospective voting literature (e.g., Ferejohn 1986; Fiorina 1981) , this article's theory considers voters who retrospectively judge the incumbent's distributive policy. The voter observes the incumbent's disaster aid policy and evaluates the incumbent's prioritization of disaster aid. Hence, an incumbent who delivers pre-election aid develops a reputation as being likely to deliver such aid in the future, thus enhancing her favorability among voters regardless of partisanship. If the incumbent is right-wing, then this enhanced reputation may convince a left-wing voter to simply abstain from voting, as the incumbent's superior record on disaster aid has weakened the voter's overall aversion to the incumbent and motivation to oust her.
Empirically, this article tests these theoretical predictions using detailed records of 1.1 million households that applied for Federal Emergency Management Agency Exploiting variation in the timing of the delivery of FEMA aid helps to establish the causal direction of this effect. First, FEMA awards delivered in the week just before the November 2004 election had an abnormally large effect, increasing the probability of Republican (incumbent party) turnout by 5.1% and decreasing Democratic (opposition party) turnout by 3.1%. Second, several placebo tests investigate whether FEMA aid delivered immediately after the November 2004 election is statistically related to Election Day turnout. The placebo tests find that postelection aid has no effect on Election Day turnout. Hence, the analysis of pre-and post-election aid supports the causal argument that FEMA aid affects voter turnout, not vice versa.
This article proceeds as follows. The first section intuitively describes the article's theory and explains the two testable predictions of this theory concerning the effect of disaster aid on voter behavior. The online appendix presents a formal model of this theory. The second section describes the process by which FEMA distributed disaster aid to hurricane victims in 2004. The third section conducts several tests of the formal model's predictions using individual-level data on FEMA aid applications, linked to individual voter-turnout records and precinct-level election results. The final section addresses the causal direction of the finding and robustness checks.
A Theory of Disaster Aid and Voter Turnout
This section intuitively presents this article's theory and explains the two testable predictions of the theory. Additionally, the online appendix presents a more detailed formal model that derives these two predictions. Because of space constraints, this section simply summarizes the key features and assumptions of the model and informally explains the intuitive logic of the theory.
Politicians' Ideologies and Types
To set up the theory, suppose the incumbent president is ideologically right-wing, and the challenger candidate is left-wing. This illustrative setup mirrors the empirical context of this article, which examines the 2004 election with a Republican incumbent and a Democratic challenger. The theory considers two types of politicians: those who prioritize disaster aid and those who do not. A president might not prioritize disaster aid because she instead focuses her attention and public resources on other policy issues. The full formal model assumes that Nature randomly chooses each politician's type, and these two politician types are distinguished by their utility preferences over delivering disaster aid. A politician's type is independent of her ideology.
Voters do not become aware of a politician's type until they observe the president making a policy choice on disaster aid. Hence, having observed the incumbent in office during the previous term, voters develop certainty about the incumbent's type, but they remain uncertain about the challenger's type. As an illustrative example, voters might have been uncertain about President Bush's type prior to September 2005. But after the intense public scrutiny of FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina, voters updated their beliefs and developed stronger and more specific views about the Bush administration's prioritization of hurricane relief efforts. In this sense, an incumbent with a reputation for delivering disaster aid enjoys a "valence advantage," independent of voters' preferences over candidates on the ideological dimension, as modeled by Groseclose (2001) .
Voter Interests
Following Dixit and Londregan (1996) , Persson and Tabellini (2000) , Stokes (2005) , and other models of distributive politics, the theory assumes that voters have ideological preferences as well as a preference for receiving distributive benefits. Second, the act of turnout is costly for voters (e.g., Aldrich 1993) . Hence, a voter turns out only if her preference for her favored candidate is sufficiently strong.
Consequently, the delivery of hurricane aid to the voter prior to the election can affect voter behavior in one of three ways. If the voter has a strong ideological preference for the incumbent, then delivering aid prior to the election may further motivate the voter to turn out in order to secure the incumbent's reelection. If the voter has a strong ideological preference for the challenger, then pre-election aid from the incumbent may induce the voter to stay home by mitigating the voter's hostility toward the incumbent. And finally, if the voter is ideologically indifferent between the two candidates, then the delivery of aid might sway the voter's preference.
The Asymmetric Partisan Effects of Disaster Aid on Turnout
Regardless of voter ideology, the delivery of pre-election disaster aid is an informative signal that enhances the voter's belief that the incumbent will again deliver aid in the future. Hence, this enhanced belief always increases the voter's expected utility from having the incumbent reelected.
Whether this enhanced belief increases or decreases turnout depends on the voter's ideological preference over the two candidates. If the voter is right-wing and already prefers the incumbent on ideological grounds, then this enhanced belief induced by disaster aid simply provides yet an additional motivation to turn out and reelect the incumbent, thus increasing the probability of turnout.
But disaster aid would have the opposite effect on turnout for a left-wing voter. If she turns out, the leftwing voter always prefers the left-wing challenger candidate on ideological grounds. Hence, the left-wing voter's probability of turnout depends on how strongly she prefers the challenger over the incumbent. The delivery of pre-election disaster aid to the left-wing voter enhances the voter's perception of the incumbent, thus mitigating the voter's motivation to oust the incumbent. This decreased motivation to vote the incumbent out of office decreases the left-wing aid recipient's probability of turnout. This theory thus makes the following prediction:
Hypothesis 1: The delivery of disaster aid prior to the election causes an increase in turnout for an incumbentsupporting recipient but a decrease in turnout for a challenger-supporting recipient.
This hypothesis is stated formally as Proposition 1 in the formal model in the online appendix.
The Effects of Disaster Aid on the Incumbent's Vote Share
In Hypothesis 1, the delivery of aid increases incumbent supporters' turnout while decreasing opposition turnout. Furthermore, as noted above, conditional on turning out, the partisan left-wing and right-wing voters support the challenger and the incumbent in the election, respectively. Hence, disaster aid causes either an increase in the incumbent's vote totals or a decrease in the challenger's vote totals, depending on whether the voter is left-or right-wing. In either case, the net effect on the incumbent's vote share is therefore always a positive one, a result consistent with previous empirical findings in the disaster relief literature (e.g., Reeves 2011). Hypothesis 2 summarizes this testable prediction:
Hypothesis 2: The delivery of disaster aid prior to the election causes an increase in the incumbent candidate's electoral vote share.
The following section describes the context of the FEMA disaster aid data, and these data are used to test the two predictions of the theory. This article focuses primarily on testing Hypothesis 1, while Hypothesis 2 is tested in the Alternative Causal Explanations section.
The Distribution of FEMA Disaster Aid
This section describes three important characteristics of FEMA disaster aid. Hence, consistent with previous literature on presidents' disaster responses, the distribution of FEMA aid does not manifest from any strategic county-level targeting of presidential disaster declarations within Florida. Reeves (2011) finds that the president is more likely to issue disaster declarations in states that are electorally competitive, while Garrett and Sobel (2002) and Downton and Pielke (2001) Disaster aid under IHP cannot be awarded or restricted on the basis of residents' income, a statutory mandate codified in 42 USC § 5163 and 42 USC § 5174(b)(1) and implemented in 44 C.F.R. § 206.113. Instead, the primary restrictions are that IHP aid only covers inspectorverified damage at an applicant's primary residence, FEMA awards may not duplicate insurance payouts, and households may not receive more than $25,000 in total aid. In particular, the prohibition against duplicating insurance payouts had the effect of disqualifying many wealthier homeowners from receiving some categories of FEMA aid. Nevertheless, many households with flood insurance still qualified for FEMA aid to cover uninsured possessions and expenses.
Presidential Disaster Declarations
The universal nature of FEMA disaster aid is an important distinction, given the previous literature on turnout. Scholars of political participation have found that social spending programs mobilize voter turnout only when benefits are distributed under universal, non-means-tested programs (e.g., Mettler 2005; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) . For example, Mettler and Stonecash (2008) find that the beneficiaries of universal programs such as Veterans Benefits and Medicare vote at higher rates than nonbeneficiaries. By contrast, Soss (1999 Soss ( , 2002 and Bruch, Ferree, and Soss (2009) find that means-tested welfare programs stigmatize voters, thus possibly discouraging them from political participation.
Hence, this existing literature suggests that FEMA disaster aid, which is universally available to hurricane victims regardless of their income status, might mobilize recipients to vote in order to protect potential aid in the future. Although voters cannot directly control the amount of aid delivered in the future, they can at least mobilize to reelect a politician with a past history of supporting disaster relief policies. This article contributes to the past literature by explaining why this mobilization logic is conditional on recipients' ideological proximity to the incumbent government: the delivery of benefits by a Republican administration to Republican recipients should indeed mobilize their turnout. But the delivery of benefits by a Republican administration to Democratic recipients may induce a decrease in their turnout, as the recipients' stake in protecting their benefits decreases their motivation to oust the Republican incumbent.
The FEMA Aid Decision Process
Residents self-select into applying for IHP aid simply by providing their names and contact information to FEMA in person, by telephone, or through FEMA's website. Although applicants may describe the hurricane damage to their property, they are not permitted to request a specific aid amount. Nor does an applicant's description of damage either limit or enhance the amount of aid his or her household is eligible to receive.
Instead, a FEMA inspector visits each applicant's residence to complete a checklist of damaged property and to estimate the severity of any such damages. By protocol, FEMA personnel check for a standard list of damaged areas in each home, regardless of whether the applicant had reported damages in such areas. Specifically, the FEMA inspector assigns a score of "X," "Y," or "Z" to each room and each area of the residence, indicating the severity of the hurricane damage. For each particular type of room (e.g., kitchen, living room) and for a particular level of damage ("X," "Y," or "Z"), FEMA awards a predetermined amount of assistance, regardless of the actual value of the applicant's pre-hurricane property. Hence, the applicant has no formal opportunities to strategically manipulate the FEMA aid process by exaggerating the severity of hurricane damage.
In the aftermath of the 2004 Florida hurricanes, FEMA received applications for IHP aid from 1.1 million unique households. FEMA approved aid awards for about 40% of these applications, distributing over $1.2 billion in total assistance. The size of these awards varied widely, ranging from under $100 to $25,000, depending upon the FEMA inspectors' assessments of damages. Figure App.1 of the online appendix details the distribution of these awards.
By requiring inspectors to check for residential damage, FEMA's inspection procedures effectively distributed IHP disaster aid most heavily to areas that experienced the most severe hurricane storms. This geographic pattern is illustrated in Figure App .2 of the online appendix, which depicts the maximum wind speeds observed during Hurricane Charley, the first declared disaster of the 2004 Atlantic hurricane season (FEMA Disaster #1539). The bright pink areas in this map represent the highest measured winds of over 130 miles per hour, reflecting that Hurricane Charley entered Florida's Gulf coast through Cape Coral, traveled northeast across the state, and exited Florida's Atlantic coast just south of Daytona Beach. The green dots on the map identify the geocoded locations of all Florida residents who applied for and successfully received some disaster aid under FEMA Disaster #1539. Although aid recipients appear throughout the entire state, this map illustrates that the vast majority of the recipients were geographically concentrated along the center of Hurricane Charley's path as the storm crossed Florida.
The Effect of FEMA Aid on Individual
Voter Turnout Homeland Security (No. 05-16771 and No. 06-13306) , forced FEMA to turn over detailed records on the Florida FEMA aid applicants. These records contain the addresses of the 1.1 million households that applied for aid and the dollar amounts awarded to the 40% of applicants who were approved for aid.
Using these data, I matched the FEMA applicant addresses to Florida voter registration forms, on which voters must self-report their residential addresses. I then used these records to identify all registered voters whose household applied for Registered voters are not required to affiliate with a party, but most do so because Florida operates closed presidential primaries. Table App .1 of the online appendix details the breakdown of FEMA applicants by party affiliation, showing that 83% of registered voters who applied for aid are affiliated with either the Democratic or Republican parties. Additionally, the histograms in Figure App .1 illustrate the distribution of FEMA award sizes across the Democratic and Republican registrants in the data. These histograms show that FEMA applicants from the two parties received a comparable range of award sizes. The mean award size for approved applicants in these data was $682.
Equation (1) is a test of Hypothesis 1, which predicts that with a right-wing incumbent, distributive aid should increase right-wing voter turnout while decreasing left-wing turnout. Specifically, equation (1) 
where Application Approved i indicates whether the applicant was awarded aid. 
Effect of FEMA Aid on Turnout Probability
In Table 1 , Model 3 estimates equation (1) using the full set of Democratic and Republican voters, and Models 1 and 2 estimate equation (1) by examining Democrats and Republican voters separately. The online appendix (Table   App. 2) also reestimates the full equation (1) models using standard errors clustered at the county level.
Overall, the 
Control Variables
In Table 1 , Models 4 to 6 control for several hurricanerelated and demographic variables. I geocode the voters in the data using the home addresses listed on their voter registrations. Using NOAA satellite data with discrete wind vectors recorded during each major hurricane, I interpolated the hurricane winds experienced at each voter's residential location. The Table 1 
Effect of FEMA Aid Delivered One Week before the Election
Intuitively, the effect of aid awarded just prior to the election should be especially large. To test this intuition, I divide all FEMA awards into two groups: (1) awards delivered during the week prior to the election, October 27 to November 2 (5% of all awards); and (2) awards delivered at all earlier times (95% of all awards). I then estimate the effects of awards delivered just prior to the election. In the online appendix, Table App. 3 presents the full model specifications and coefficient estimates, and the estimated turnout effects are summarized as follows. FEMA awards delivered one week prior to the election cause a +5.1% increase in the probability of For a similarly situated Democrat, the effect of receiving FEMA aid one week before the election is a 3.1% decrease in the probability of turnout, with a confidence interval of [−1.2%, −5.0%]. Hence, FEMA aid delivered one week before the election has an abnormally large effect on Republican and Democratic turnout. Later placebo tests show that post-election FEMA aid has no significant effect on turnout, providing further support for the hypothesized causal direction.
Effect of FEMA Award Sizes
FEMA awards vary widely in size, and although this article's theory does not incorporate this complexity, larger award sizes should intuitively cause larger positive and negative turnout effects for Republicans and Democrats, respectively. Most awardees received under $2,000, but awards ranged up to $25,000. Because of this significant right tail, The results in Table App .4 confirm that larger award sizes indeed produce turnout effects of significantly greater magnitude. For Democrats (Model 1), receiving an average-sized award of $682 causes a 1.5% decrease in turnout probability for a previous nonvoter. By contrast, Model 2 estimates that for Republicans, the same award size causes a 1.3% increase in turnout probability.
How substantively large are these turnout effects of FEMA aid? In the most extreme case, the earlier results estimated that FEMA awards delivered one week prior to the election cause a 5.1% increase in the probability of Republican turnout. This estimate implies that $13,373 of FEMA aid produces one new Republican voter, an estimate that is nearly identical to Levitt and Snyder's (1997) calculation that $14,000 of federal spending generates one additional vote for an incumbent legislator. But for FEMA aid delivered temporally further away from the election, the turnout effect is much smaller: $32,476 of aid increases Republican turnout by one voter. Hence, although delivering FEMA aid produces statistically significant effects on Republican and Democratic turnout, disaster aid is likely not the most impactful type of federal spending when compared to the many types of federal spending in the Levitt and Snyder (1997) data.
Robustness of Empirical Findings
Having illustrated the main statistical relationship between FEMA aid delivery and voter turnout, this article proceeds to evaluate the causal direction and the empirical robustness of this main finding. To do so, this section explores several placebo tests, potential omitted variables, and selection issues that arise in the FEMA aid data. Collectively, these additional empirical tests strengthen this article's main empirical argument that FEMA aid increased turnout among incumbent supporters and decreased turnout among opposition voters.
Causal Identification and Placebo Tests
What is the causal direction of the empirical relationship between FEMA aid and increased turnout in November 2004? Two potential alternative explanations for the main findings in Table 1 To test for these alternative causal explanations, this section presents several placebo tests that take advantage of the temporal distribution of FEMA aid applications. FEMA continued to accept aid applications through December 2004, and although the majority of hurricane victims applied for aid before November, 40,656 registered Democrats and Republicans in the data did not apply until after the November general election.
The placebo test therefore examines whether FEMA aid that was awarded after the November election affects Election Day turnout. Election turnout and post-election FEMA aid should be correlated only if reverse causality or an omitted variable is driving the main Table 1 results. The placebo tests reestimate the equation (1) The placebo test results appear in Table 2 . The six logit models estimated in Table 3 are identical to the six models reported in Table 1 , except that the data include only post-election applicants. Each of the six placebo tests in Table 2 finds no statistically significant effect of postelection FEMA aid on Election Day turnout. In contrast to the Table 1 results, Republicans who would later receive FEMA aid after the election did not exhibit higher turnout than nonrecipients. Nor was there a significant turnout effect for Democrats who would subsequently receive FEMA aid. The magnitudes of the Application Approved i coefficients estimated in the placebo tests are also much smaller than in the Table 1 results and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Thus, the placebo tests fail to find evidence of reverse causality in the main tests of equation (1).
Effect of Previous Turnout on Program Participation
A possible selection issue in the main results is that individuals may self-select into applying for FEMA aid based on factors that are also related to their turnout. Such selfselection is plausible, given that civic skills, as described by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) , may explain both turnout and applying for aid. If such self-selection occurs, then the population that applied for aid is not perfectly comparable to those who did not apply for aid, thus potentially limiting the external validity of this article's findings.
To test for and correct such self-selection bias, Table 3 employs a Heckman selection model. The (2) were registered as either a Democrat or Republican. These two criteria produce a full set of 3,571,284 individuals, representing the universe of previously registered voters who were eligible to apply for FEMA aid in Florida. As previously noted, only 268,752 (7.5%) of these individuals actually applied for aid prior to the November election.
The Heckman selection model results appear as follows. The right column of Table 3 presents the selection model, which estimates self-selection into applying for FEMA aid among the full set of 3.57 million eligible residents. The middle column of equation (1), except that the parameters of the Heckman outcome model and the selection model are jointly estimated via maximum likelihood. Finally, for comparison purposes, the left column of Table 3 presents a standard uncorrected probit model estimating equation (1).
The Heckman model in Table 3 reveals three findings. First, the selection model in the right column finds that previous 2002 voters are indeed more likely to apply for FEMA aid than nonvoters, even after accounting for hurricane wind speeds and various demographics. Second, this self-selection indeed affects the corrected outcome model, and the model results reject the null hypothesis that the outcome equation and selection equation are independent. But third, the estimated effects of FEMA aid on turnout in the corrected Heckman outcome model remain statistically significant and in the same directions as in the main results. Substantively, the estimated turnout effects are only slightly smaller in magnitude than in the standard uncorrected probit model in the left column of reveal that self-selection indeed affects the composition of applicants in the data, but after correcting for selection bias, the main results regarding increased Republican turnout and decreased Democratic turnout still hold.
Effect of Previous Turnout on FEMA Application Approval
A related issue is that turnout in the previous election is related to the approval of one's FEMA application.
Since Key (1949) , political scientists have suggested that voters who exhibit higher turnout rates may receive favorable treatment from the government. For example, Aldrich and Crook (2008) find that undesirable FEMA trailer parks are targeted toward neighborhoods with lower voter turnout. If FEMA treats previous voters and nonvoters differently, then approved FEMA applicants may be dissimilar in political activeness to rejected applicants in the data, thus raising the possibility that this article's main findings may not generalize to all types of voters.
To explore this possibility, the bottom portion of Table 4 compares FEMA approval rates for November 2002 voters and nonvoters. Previous nonvoters had their applications approved at a slightly higher rate than previous voters. The likely explanation for this finding is that previous voters applied for FEMA aid more aggressively, even after controlling for wind speeds, as illustrated by the estimated Heckman selection model in Table 3 . Consequently, these previous voters were more likely to be rejected, as these aggressive applications were less likely to have been justified by hurricane conditions.
To account for this issue, the upper portion of Table 4 analyzes the main equation (1) model separately for previous voters and nonvoters, as these two groups represent different self-selected samples of voters. Although the findings are consistent with the main empirical results of this article, Table 4 Analogously, for Democrats, receiving FEMA aid causes an estimated 1.1% decrease in the turnout of previous nonvoters (Model 4), but only a statistically insignificant decrease in the turnout of previous voters (Model 1). Hence, previous turnout indeed affects the magnitude, though not the direction, of voters' November 2004 responses to FEMA aid: overall, previous nonvoters exhibit larger turnout effects from receiving FEMA aid.
Partisan Differences in Hurricane Victimization
Did Democratic and Republican applicants in the data experience significantly different levels of hurricane victimization during the 2004 season? The data demonstrate that Republican voters in Florida were slightly more likely to be victimized by hurricanes than Democrats. Figure  App. 3 of the online appendix details this pattern by plotting the distribution of maximum wind speeds experienced by the individual voters of each party. This figure reveals that at the areas with the strongest hurricane winds of over 65 miles per hour, victims were more likely to be Republicans than Democrats. To address this confounding factor, I examine whether the main findings hold when comparing Democratic and Republican applicants who experienced identical hurricane severity. To make such comparisons, Figure 1 sorts FEMA applicants into six groups, based on the hurricane wind severity observed at the applicants' respective residences. The left plot displays Democratic FEMA applicants who abstained in November 2002, while the right plot contains Republican applicants who abstained in 2002. Within each plot and within each of the six groups, Figure 1 compares the November 2004 turnout rate of FEMA aid awardees against the turnout rate of rejected applicants. This difference in turnout rate thus reflects the effect of FEMA aid on turnout within each group. Figure 1 reveals that the main turnout findings for Republicans and Democrats hold within each of the six levels of hurricane severity. Within each level, Democrats receiving aid exhibited lower turnout rates than Democrats who were denied aid. And within each group, Republican awardees exhibited higher turnout rates than rejected Republican applicants. Hence, the main results hold when comparing Republicans and Democrats with similar hurricane victimization.
Partisan Bias in the Awarding of FEMA Aid
In addition to differences in hurricane victimization, Democrat and Republican aid applicants may have received disparate treatment by FEMA. If partisan bias occurred, then such biased treatment by FEMA could possibly elicit either positive or negative reactions by voters, thus affecting their turnout.
Indeed, Table 4 suggests the possibility of such partisan bias by illustrating that Republican applicants (53.7%) were awarded aid at a slightly higher rate than Democratic applicants (50.2%). But the higher approval rate for Republicans also reflects the fact that Republicans were victimized by hurricanes more severely. To examine more carefully whether FEMA exhibited bias, Figure 2 considers how FEMA treated applicants of each party after controlling for two important predictors of disaster aid eligibility: (1) the hurricane severity at the applicant's home and (2) the applicant's income. Higher-income individuals are more likely to carry flood insurance, thus disqualifying them from receiving FEMA aid for damages to insured property.
To control for these two factors, Figure 2 compares the average FEMA aid awarded to Republican and Democratic applicants within each of three income categories and within each of six categories of hurricane wind severity. In Figure 2 , average Republican aid awards are depicted in red triangles, while Democrats are in blue circles. Overall, this figure illustrates that within each income group and at each level of hurricane severity, Democratic and Republican applicants are treated similarly by FEMA, with no systematic pattern of Republican favoritism. In fact, the most notable partisan disparity occurs within the lowest income group, where Democrats receive slightly larger aid awards, though the magnitude of these differences is relatively small. In sum, after considering applicants' hurricane severity and household income, there is no strong evidence that FEMA engaged in individuallevel targeting of Republican applicants in its distribution of aid. As a further illustration of this lack of Republican targeting, Figure App 
Partisan Differences in Efficacy of FEMA Experiences
A related issue is that even if FEMA awarded aid equitably to Democrats and Republicans, Democratic applicants could still have been treated less efficiently by FEMA's inspectors. This potential concern is important to explore because previous literature on social programs has found that inefficacious program administration can cause political discouragement among clients. For example, Soss (1999) and Mettler and Stonecash (2008) find that poor beneficiaries of some means-tested programs, including AFDC and food stamps, exhibit lower political participation because of the stigmatizing, inefficacious, and unresponsive administration of such programs.
To explore whether FEMA treated Democratic applicants more inefficaciously than Republicans, I counted the number of days that elapsed from the initial filing of each application until FEMA's inspection and final disposition of the application. While most applicants waited no more than one week for an inspection, some applicants in areas with especially severe hurricane damage waited up to several weeks for FEMA to respond.
The data reveal that Democrats were not treated more slowly than Republicans. Figure App .5 of the online appendix illustrates this pattern in greater detail, showing the average wait term endured by Democratic and Republican applicants sorted by the hurricane wind severity at their respective homes. In fact, for applicants living in areas of moderate hurricane damage (45 to 85 mileper-hour winds), Republican applicants actually waited slightly longer than Democrats for FEMA to respond, though these differences are not large.
Next, having found that Democratic applications were not processed less efficaciously, I examine whether applicants' waiting times affected their November 2004 turnout. The Waiting Time variable is never a significant predictor of turnout, and its inclusion in these models does not alter the main finding that FEMA aid decreases turnout among Democrats and increases turnout among Republicans.
Spatial Autocorrelation
Hurricane victimization occurs in a geographically clustered fashion, and the damage from the 2004 hurricane season and the ensuing disaster aid from FEMA were distributed unevenly throughout Florida. Hence, these geographic patterns raise the possibility that the main turnout results in Table 1 may be largely driven by voters in a small number of localized areas within Florida. The following two robustness checks address this possibility.
First, I test for spatial autocorrelation in the residuals of the main Table 1 calculate the residuals from Model 4 of Table 1 , which predicts FEMA aid's effect on Democratic turnout. I geocoded the residuals using each voter's residential address and display a map of these residuals in Figure App Table 1 , which predicts FEMA aid's effect on Republican turnout. Together, these tests find no significant evidence of spatial autocorrelation in the residuals for either Democratic or Republican voters.
As a second test, Table 5 corroborate the theoretical prediction of Hypothesis 2: in both Republican and Democratic areas, the increase in Republican turnout and the decrease in Democratic turnout caused by FEMA aid both appear to positively affect Bush's vote share. In Republican-leaning precincts (Model 5), a $100 per capita increase in FEMA aid causes a 1.0% increase in Bush's 2004 vote share; this estimate has a 95% confidence interval of +0.9% to +1.1%. In Democratic-leaning precincts (Model 4), a $100 per capita increase in aid causes a 0.5% increase in Bush's 2004 vote share, with a confidence interval of +0.4% to +0.6%.
The online appendix presents two further robustness checks of these basic tests of Hypothesis 2. First, Table  App .7 reestimates all of the Table 5 models using clustered standard errors; although the estimated clustered standard errors are larger, the overall effects of FEMA aid on Bush vote share remain statistically significant. Second, Figure 
Discussion
This article makes three new contributions to the existing literature on distributive spending and political participation. First, it illustrates that one important effect of government spending is the suppression of voter participation among opposition party constituents while simultaneously mobilizing core constituents. Past empirical studies have argued that distributive spending affects electoral outcomes by mobilizing core voter turnout (e.g., Cox and Kouser 1981; Nicther 2007) or by persuading moderate or swing voters (e.g., Londregan 1996, 1998; Stokes 2005 ).
This article contributes to this literature by empirically demonstrating that in addition to the core and swing voter effects, distributive benefits may also enhance the incumbent party's electoral prospects by suppressing the opposing party's voter turnout. Previously, formal models by Heckelman (1998) , Morgan and Vardy (2006) , and Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter (2009) have suggested the possibility of "negative turnout buying" or "buying abstention," whereby a party explicitly bribes opposition voters to abstain from voting. Anecdotally, Cox and Kousser (1981) , Argersinger (1987), and Schaffer (2002) described historical instances in which parties may have engaged in "negative turnout buying" strategies. While the electoral impacts of FEMA aid certainly do not qualify as "negative turnout buying," they nevertheless describe a related situation in which distributive benefits persuade opposition voters to abstain from participating in an election. This article is the first to provide systematic, individual-level evidence that a party's delivery of distributive benefits can indeed depress the electoral turnout of the opposition party's voters.
Second, this article's theory explains, and the empirical results illustrate, why a nonpartisan distributive program can cause such partisan disparity in political participation. In studies of developing democracies and political machines, a discussion of swing voter (e.g., Londregan 1996, 1998; Stokes 2005) and core voter models (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1986; Nichter 2007) can safely presume that a political party often has the option of targeting distributive benefits to a chosen constituency primarily on the basis of partisan or ideological loyalties.
But a distinguishing feature of developed democracies is that norms of government transparency and accountability effectively preclude parties from engaging in extreme targeting of public spending. Indeed, at the individual level, there is no evidence that FEMA favored Republican aid applicants over Democrats. Hence, the article's theory assumes that a right-wing president cannot target aid to Republicans and discriminate against Democrats.
Why does this nonpartisan nature of FEMA aid cause a partisan disparity in turnout effects? As disaster aid cannot be targeted to Republicans, a right-wing incumbent who provides pre-election disaster relief can therefore credibly develop a reputation among all voters for prioritizing disaster aid. This enhanced reputation mitigates a left-wing voter's ideological opposition to the incumbent while augmenting the right-wing voter's ideological preference for the incumbent. Consequently, the left-wing aid recipient has less motivation to vote and expel the incumbent, while the right-wing recipient has increased motivation to vote and reelect the incumbent. Hence, these dynamics produce the counterintuitive result that a nonpartisan FEMA aid program actually causes disparate partisan effects on turnout for Republicans and Democrats.
Finally, this article's results explain why distributive spending can simultaneously boost incumbent politicians' electoral fortunes (e.g., Pacek and Radcliff 1995) while also decreasing political participation among many recipients (e.g., Soss 1999) . Examining cross-country voting data, Radcliff (1992) and Pacek and Radcliff (1995) argue that large welfare states may protect incumbent politicians from being punished during economic busts. Singer (2011) presents similar findings by examining incumbent vote shares in U.S. state legislative elections.
This article helps to explain why these two observed effects of welfare-depressed turnout but increased incumbent support-can emerge theoretically when one accounts for the partisan biases of the beneficiaries of distributive programs. The delivery of distributive benefits lowers the turnout of voters who were already disinclined to support the incumbent government. This lower turnout among opposition voters effectively increases the incumbent's vote share and reelection chances. Hence, the findings suggest that politicians benefit electorally even when they deliver aid to voters who are ideologically opposed.
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